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ABSTRACT
Liabilityand safety regulation are examined
as means of controlling risks in a theoretical model of the
occurrence of accidents. According to the model, regulation
does not result in appropriate reduction of risk --dueto
the regulator's lack of knowledge about risk —-nordoes
liability result in that outcome --becausethe incentives
it creates are diluted by the chance that parties would not
be sued for harm done or would not be able to pay fully for
it. Thus, either liability could turn out to be superior to
regulation or the reverse could be true. But as is stressed,
joint use of the two means of controlling risk is generally
socially advantageous, and the characteristics of their
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I. Introduction and Summary
This paper will study a theoretical model of the occur-
rence of accidents in which the use of liability for harm
done and of regulation of behavior will be examined as means
of controlling accident risks. It will be assumed in the
model that parties may, at a cost, take "care" to reduce
accident risks, and that these risks may vary depending on
their circumstances. It will therefore be socially desir-
able for parties to choose their levels of care in accord-
ance with their particular circumstances; the greater the
risks that they create, the higher should be their levels of
care.
Neither regulation nor liability, however, will result
in the model in parties taking the desirable, "first-best"
levels of care. Specifically, regulation will not result in
this outcome because the information about risk available to
the regulatory authority will be imperfect. And liability
will not lead to an ideal outcome because parties' incentives
to take care will be inadequate (for reasons to be noted
shortly), and possibly --inan extension of the basic model
to be studied --becauseof incompleteness of their informa-—2—
tion about risk. Depending on the importance of these
factors, either liability or regulation could turn out to be
preferredwhenthey are considered as alternative methods
for the control of risk, but (as will bestressed)itwill
often be socially advantageous for the two methods to be
jointly employed.
basic model. The analysis of these points in the basic
model will proceed as follows. It will first be asked how
use of liability alone would function to reduce accident
risks, supposing that parties have perfect knowledge of the
risks they create but that their incentives to take care
could be diluted for two reasons: their assets might not be
sufficient to pay fully for harm done (meaning that they
would not bear the full social cost of their actions); or
they might not be sued for harm done. (These two causes of
dilution of incentives are not unimportant:' it is fre-
quently the case that a party's potential for doing harm is
great in relation to its assets, even if the party is a
large firm; and in some contexts, notably in regard to
health-related and environmental risks, a party might not be
sued for harm done because the harm might be difficult to
trace to its source or because the harm might be highly
dispersed.) Thus, it will indeed be the case that parties
will choose to take less than the first-best levels of care;
butbecause they recognize the magnitudeofthe risksthey
create,their levels of care will still generally bear a
positive relation to the risks.—3—
In the next section, it will be asked how use of regula-
tion alone would work to control accident risks, presuming
that parties must adhere to a regulatory standard of care as
a precondition for engaging in their activities.2 Further,
this standard will be a uniform one, owing to an assumption
that the regulator does not know parties' circumstances on
an individual basis and therefore cannot modify the standard
in view of them. Hence, the care parties take will not
reflect the particular risks that they create; and under the
(optimal) standard, parties presenting less than the average
risk will have been forced to take more than their first-best
levels of care, and those presenting more than the average
risk will have been allowed to take less than their first—
best levels of care.
The use of liability and regulation will then be consid-
ered as alternatives, and the comparison will depend on the
factors just discussed: on the "informational" advantage of
liability over regulation --thatdecisions about care are
made by those (the parties) possessing the better information
about risk --andon the relative disadvantage of liability --
thatthe factors which dilute incentives under liability are
of no import where behavior is directly controlled.3
After making this comparison, it will be asked how
joint use of liability and regulation would affect accident
risks, where by joint use is meant that parties must satisfy
the regulatory standard and will in addition be liable for
harm done. Here it will be shown under a general condition-4-
that many parties ——thosecreating other than relatively
low risks --willbe led to do more than to satisfy the
regulatory standard, for their potential liability will make
that. worth their while. And at the same time, just because
such parties will take more care than is required, it will
be socially desirable for the regulatory standard to be
lower than if regulation were used alone; a reduction of the
standard can in effectbe afforded because liability is
present to take up some of the "slack" associated with the
lower standard. (Or at least liability can take up some of
this slack if the incentive to take care is not too much
diluted, which is the noted general condition.)
Last, joint use of liability and regulation will be
compared to use alone of either of the two methods for the
control of risk; and here under the general condition joint
use will be best for the reasons just discussed; otherwise,
however, joint use will offer no advantage.
extension of the model. An extension of the basic
model will then be considered in which the regulator but not
the parties know the value of a parameter that determines
risk4 (along with parties' circumstances, which the regula-
tor is still assumed to be unable to observe). This will
raise the possibility that regulation can be used to correct
for the systematically low level of care that would other-
wise result if parties underestimated the parameter of risk.—5—
numerical example; conclusion. Next, a numerical
example that illustrates the results of the analysis will be
presented, and following this, concluding comments will be
made concerning the interpretation of the analysis and the
importance of a factor that was omitted from it.
II. Basic Model
A.Description of model. Risk neutral parties may
reduce the probability of causing harm by making expenditures
on care, and the magnitude of the harm they might do will
depend on their circumstances. Specifically, define
x =levelof care; x 0;
p(x) =probabilityof causing an accident; 0p(x) <1;
p'(x) <0;p''(x) >0;and
h =magnitudeof harmifan accident occurs,
where ii differs among parties, each of whom knows his own Ii.
The regulator, however, is aware only of the distribution of
h, and let
1(h) =probabilitydensity of h; f(h) >0on and only
on [a,b], 0 <a<b.
Assume that the social welfare criterion is minimization of
the expected sumofthe costs of care and of harm done.
Thus, the first-best level of care as a function of a party'B
h is determined by minimizing over x—6—
(1) x +p(x)h,
or by the first-order condition,5
(2) 1 =
whichof course has the interpretation that the marginal
cost of care, 1, equals the marginal benefits in termsof
the expected reduction in harm, -p'(x)h. Denote by x*(h)
the first—best level of care and observe that it is in-
creasing in h.6
B.Liability as the sole means of controlling risk.
Assume that a party's potential for doing harm might exceed
his assets; and assume also that the probability of being
sued for harmdonemight be less than 1. Thus, define
y =party'sassets, a non-negative amount; and
q =probabilityof suit given that harm has been
done; 0q 1,
where y and g are the same for each party. Now if a party
causes harm h and is sued, he will be liable for h,7 but pay
that amount only if Iiy. Hence, his problem is to choose
his level of care x to minimize
(3) x +p(x)qmin{h,y},
and let the solution to this be denoted
xL(h) =careselected by a party given h.
Then we have-.7-.
Proposition 1. Under liability, the care taken by




That is, unless the probability of suit is 1 and assets are
sufficient to pay for harm, the incentive to take care will
be diluted, and the level of care will be less than first-best,
but it will increase with the magnitude of the risk so long
as this is less than the level of assets.
Note. Graphs of x2andx (for a g <1)are shown in
Fig. 1.
Proof. Since the right-hand side of (3) is identical
in form to (1), it is clear that x(h) is determined by the
first equality in (4). The inequality in (4) follows since
(as observed above) x is increasing in its argument and
since qmin(h,y) <hif g <1.or if y <Ii.Also, since
qinin{h,y) =qyfor h >y,the shape of the graph of xLin
Fig. 1.isexplained. Q.E.D.
C.Regulation as the sole means of controlling risk.
Because the regulator cannot observe h, the standard he sets
must be uniform over the parties, and his problem of mini-
mizing expected social costs is a simple one: Iffir3f - bjt
C4rt





and s must be satisfied in order for a party to engage in his
activity, then the regulator's problem is to minimize over s
b
(5) s + p(s)fhf(h)dh =S+ p(s)E(h),
a
where E denotes the expectation. Let
8* =optimalregulatory standard,
the solution to (5). Then
Proposition 2. Under regulation, the optimal standard
equals the level of care that would be first-best for a
party posing the average risk of harm, that is,
(6) s* =
inparticular, parties presenting a risk h less than E(h)
take more care than is first-best, and those presenting a
risk higher than E(h) take less care than is first-best.
Note. Fig. 2 shows the situation under B*.
Proof. Since the right-hand side of (5) is identical
in form to (1), it is clear that s is determined by (6).
Q.E.D.OptIrud&torj
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D.Regulation vs. liability. The difference in expected
social costs between the situation where liability is employed





From this, we obtain
Proposition 3. Use of regulation will be superior to
use of liability if the factors that dilute the incentive to
take care under liability are sufficiently important (g or y
sufficiently low) or if the variability in different parties'
circumstances is sufficiently small (h sufficiently con-
centrated about E(h)); otherwise liability will be superior
to regulation.
Notes. More precisely, the claims are, first, that
given y, there is a q(y) where 0 <q(y)1 such that regula-
tion is superior to liability for qg(y) and liability is
superior to regulation for g >g(y).Second, that given q,
there is a y(q) where 0 <y()b with properties analogous
to those of q(y). And third, that given q <1or y <
ifthe probability mass of h is sufficiently concentrated
about E(h), the regulation is superior to liability. To see
why these claims should be true, consider Fig. 3, which
shows that regulation will be superior to liability in a
region R about E(h) if x lies below x. Now it is clear








I- Ifalls, the region R grows; and it is also clear that as the
probability mass becomes more concentrated about E(h), the
likelihood of being in region R increases; thus the validity
of the claims is evident.
Proof. If q or y equals 0, then (4) implies that x2(h)
is identically equal to 0, and thus the situation is as if
S= 0.But since S is the (unique) optimal s and is positive,
social costs must be lower under regulation than when q or y
equals 0. This fact and continuity of social costs in q
imples that for any y, regulation is superior to liability
for all q sufficiently small. Moreover, if liability is
superior to regulation for some q1, then the same must be
true for any q2 >q1;for social costs are easily shown to
be decreasing in q under liability but are unaffected by q
under regulation. The first claim therefore follows. The
second claim is established similarly. Regarding the other
claim, note from (4) that if q <1or y <E(h),then x(E(h))
<x(E(h)),but the latter equals 5*•Bence,by continuity,
there must exist a non-degenerate interval including E(h) in
which s* +p(s*)h<x(h)
+p(x)h.Thus, if enough pro-
bability mass is within this interval, (7) will be positive,
and regulation will be superior to liability. Q.E.D.
E.Joint use of regulation and liability. Assume now
that parties must satisfy a regulatory standard and are also
subject to liability. Then their levels of care will be
given by max{s,x2(h)), and the situation will be as shown in










will take care of l' and others will take care of x2(h).8
On the other hand, for an s such as that exceeds x(b),
all parties will take care of With this in mind, it is
evident that the problem of the regulatory authority is to
minimize over s
a
(8) f[max{s,x2(h)} +p(max(s,x(hfl)hJf(h)dh, b
or, eguivalently,
h(s) b





Let s denote the solution to (8) and (8'). Then we have
Proposition 4. Under optimal joint use of regulation
and liability, there are two possible types of outcome in
situations where the incentive to take care is diluted (q
1, y <b):1°
(a) The optimal regulatory standard is less than the
optimal standard were regulation used alone, but it exceeds
thefirst-best level of care for those parties posing the
least risk; that is,
(9) x*(a) <s**<S*;
furthermore,some parties are induced by liability to take
more care than the required standard s**. A sufficient
condition for this case to hold is—12—
(10) x2(b) >5*,
or,equivalently, that the incentive to take care is not too
diluted (q sufficiently close to 1,y to b).
(b) Or, the optimal regulatory standard equals theop-
timal standard where regulation alone was employed; thatis,
(11) **= 5*;
additionally,no party is induced by liability to take more
care than s. This case will obtain ifx(b) is sufficiently
low, or, equivalently, if the incentive to take care is
sufficiently diluted (q or y suffiently low).
However, in situtations where the incentive to take
care is complete (q =1,y b), then of course
(C)theoptimal regulatory standard is o)1
Notes.(a) To explain this result and why s may be
less than s* (perhaps the typical case), consider Fig. 5a
and the condition (10), which it is clear means thatsome
parties are induced by liability to take more care than s*.
Now the reason that this condition implies that s <5* is
essentially that when regulation alone was used, reducing
the standard below s* was not worthwhile because it resulted
in all parties taking less care than 5*;buthere it results
only in those parties with h <h(s*)taking less care ——for
parties with higher h are induced by liability to take more
care than s*. Thus we said in the introduction that lia-
bility could take up some of the slack resulting from lower-
ing the regulatory standard below s*.—13—
On the other hand, to understand why s > x*(a),
observe that raising the standard from the level x*(a) would
not lead to any first-order change in expected social costs
in respect to parties with h =abut would result in a
first-order reduction in expected social costs in respect to
all other parties with higher h who would not have been
induced by liability to take as much care as x*(a).
In addition, note from the proof that in the present




the interpretation of which is that the marginal cost of
care equals the expected reduction in harm,wherethe ex-
pectation is over only those parties who are not affected by
liability and thus are affected by the regulatorystandard.12
(b) It is evident from Fig. 5b why this case arises
when z(b) is sufficiently low: for then the incentive to
take care created by liability is too weak to take up any of
the slack due to lowering the standard below $*; it is there-
fore best to leave the standard at s*.
(c) It is obvious that s should equal 0 in this
case, since liability will induce each party to choose the
























F.Joint use of regulation and liability vs. use of
regulation alone or of liability alone. Finally, we may
compare expected social costs resulting under joint use of
regulation and liablity (assuming s =s**),under use of
regulation alone (assuming s =s*),and under use of lia-
bility alone; we then have
Proposition 5. Any of the three methods for the
control of risk could turn out to be best:
(a) If the incentive to take care is sufficiently
diluted (q or y sufficiently low), use of regulation alone
is optimal; joint use of regulation and liability offers no
advantage.
(b) Otherwise, if the incentive to take care is diluted
(q <1,y <b),joint use of regulation and liability is
optimal.
(C)Ifthe incentive to take care under liability is
complete (q =1,yb), use of liability alone is optimal.
Notes.(a) More precisely, the assertion is that if q or
y is low enough that under joint use, s =s*,then use of
regulation alone is equivalent to joint use of regulation
and liability and is superior to use of liability alone. To
explain this, recall from Proposition 4 that if s
then under joint use no party does more than take care of
s Thus the outcome is what it is under regulation alone.—15—
Andthe outcome is different from, and therefore superior
to, the outcome under liability alone (since x(a) <
(b) Here the assumption is that q and y are not so low
that s** =5*•Thus we know from Proposition 4 that x*(a) <
St<s. This implies that the outcome under joint use of
liability and regulation is different from that under lia-
bility alone (since x1(a) ( **) and from that under reg-
ulation alone (since s < s*), and hence is superior to the
outcomes under each.
(C) If q =].andyb, then under liability alone a
first—best outcome is achieved, so the result is obvious.
Proof. The Proposition is clear from the explanation
just given in the Notes.
III. Extension of the model
Assume now that parties do not possess perfect in-
formationabout risk; rather, they and theregulator each
possesspartialinformation of which the other is ignorant.
Specifically, assume that the magnitude of harm should an
accident occur is the um of two elements: a random com-
ponent depending on a party's particular circumstances and
known by him but not by the regulator; and a parameter





=componentof harm depending on party's cir—
cuxnstances and knownonlyby him,




where as before I is positive on and only on [a,bJ, and
assume that theregulatorknows the function f. Similarly,
let
g(h2) =probabilitydensity of h2; g(h2) >0on and only on
[c,dJ, 0 <c<d,
and assume that the parties know the functon g. Note that
given these definitions, the first—best level of care is
still determined by minimizing (1), and thus by (2).
We will now reconsider what was done in the basic
model. (In the interest of brevity, we will sometimes only
sketch the results, as they (and their proofs) will be
analogous to the previous ones.)
Under use of liability alone, the party's problem is to





where it s'ould be observed that the expectation here isover
since .he party does not observeh2 but does know h1.
Let x2(h1) denote the solution to (14). Thus the care taken
by a party under liability is
(15) x2(h1) =x*(qE(min{h1+h2,y))).
It is clear from (15) that, similar to before, ifq <1or
if y c ii (with positive probability), then the incentive to
take care will be diluted in the sense thatx2(h1) (x*(h1+
E(h2)).But unlike before, there is the additional element
of parties' misperception of risk: If a party under-
estimates risk, that is, ifE(h2) <h,then the effect of
dilution of incentives will be accentuated, and thegap
between the party's care and first-best care will be made
larger; whereas if the party overestimates risk, ifE(h2) >
h2,then the effect of dilution of incentives will be offset.
This is illustrated in Fig. 6, where the graph ofx arid
thegraphs of x are shown for three different values of
1.3
h2.
Under use of regulation alone, the problem of the
regulator is to minimize over a
b










where the expectation is over h1. If we let s*(h2) denote




Thus, as before, parties presenting less (more) risk
than the average take more (less) care than is first-best;
butnow the standard depends on the information that the
regulator alone possesses; it is higher the higher is h2, as
is indicated in Fig. 6.
Thedifference in expected social costs between the
situations where liability alone and where regulation alone




and it can be shownasbefore that for given h2, regulation
will be superior to liability if q or y is sufficiently low
or if h1 is sufficiently concentrated about its mean; other-
wise liability will be superior. Now, however, the
comparison also depends on h2; in particular, regulation
will be superior to liability if h2 is much larger than
parties estimate, as is illustrated in the upper graph in
Fig. 6.—19—
Under joint use of regulation and liability, the problem
of the regulator is to niniinize the analog to (8),14
h1 ( s)
(19) min{min fEs+p(s)(h1





and using this, the analog to Proposition 4 can be established:
The optimal solution to (19), s**(h2), may be less than
s*(h2) (the optimal solution under regulation alone), in
which case some parties will take more care than
and a sufficient condition for this to hold is that xL(b) >
s*(h2).Or, s**(h2) may equal s*(h2), in which case no
party will take more care than s**(h2). On the other hand,
unlike in Proposition 4, h2 affects For example, in
Fig. 7a it is illustrated that if h2 is sufficiently higher
than parties' estimate of E(h2), then s**(h2) =s*(h2);in
Figs. 7b and 7c, it is shown that s**(h2) declines as h2 de-
clines; and in Fig. 7d, it is shown that if h2 is sufficiently
lower than E(h2), then s**(h2) =•15
Last, comparing joint use of regulation and liability
with use of either alone, then as before, any of the three
alternatives could be best. Very briefly, and as can be
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s**(h2) =s*(h2),then use of regulation alone is optimal
and joint use of it and liability offers no advantage. (This
was the case in Fig. 7a, where h2 was much greater then
E(h2).) Second, if x*(a +h2)
(s**(h)<s(h),then
joint use of regulation and liability is optimal. (Figs.
7b, 7c.) Otherwise, use of liability alone is optimal and
joint use of it and regulation offers no advantage. (This
was the case in Fig. 7d, where h2 was much less than E(h2).)
IV. Numerical example
Let us now present a numerical example illustrating the
results of the basic model and then of its extension.
example of the basic model. According to the example,
the probability of an accident as a function of expenditures
on care is p(x) = theharm that a party would cause
if an accident occurred is knownonlyby him; and this harm
isequally likely to be any thousand dollar amount between
$10,000 and $100,000 (that is, there are equal numbers of
parties who would cause $10,000 of harm, $11,000 of harm,
and so forth).
First-best expenditures on care16 for the example are
showninthe upper graph of Fig. 8; and the expenditures
that would be taken under liability alone17 are shown in the
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levels and probabilities of suit: $80,000 and 90%; $70,000
and 65%; and $60,000 and 50%. Note that the first of these
graphs becomes equal to a constant beyond $80,000 of harm,
for if a party's assets are $80,000, the prospect of doing
harm in excess of that amount will not cause him to take any
more care than he would if the harm were limited to $80,000;
and similarly the other two graphs become constant beyond
$70,000 and $60,000 respectively. Note in addition that
these graphs are ordered in the expected way: as there is
the least dilution of incentives when assets are $80,000 and
the probability of suit is 90%, the associated graph of care
is the highest among the three, and as there is the most
dilution when assets are $60,000 and the probability is 50%,
the associated graph of care is the lowest.
Also illustrated in Fig. 8 is the optimal standard of
care (s*) if regulation alone is employed. This standard
equals $86.12;18 if the standard is used, all parties who
would cause less than $55,000 of harm in an accident will
have been required to spend more on care than is first-best,
and all those who would cause more than $55,000 of harm will
have been allowed to spend less on care than is first—best.
Comparing the use of the $86.12 regulatory standard to
the use of liability alone, it turns out that use of lia-
bility is superior in the cases where assets and the prob-
ability of suit are $80,000 and 90%, and $70,000 and 65%;
but use of the standard is superior in the case where assets—22—
and the probability of suit are $60,000 and 50%, owing to
there being the greatest dilution of incentives in that case
were liability employed.
Finally, the optimal standards of care (s**) assunhing
that regulation and liability are jointly employed are
indicated in the Figure. In the case where parties' assets
are $80,000 and the probability of suit is 90%, the optimal
standard is $70; thus only a few parties (those who would
cause less than about $13,000 of harm) are actually affected
by- the standard; the rest spend more than $70 on care due to
their potential liability; the optimal standard of care is
as low as it is for this very reason. Where parties' assets
$70,000 and the probability of suit is 65%, the optimal
standard of care is $76; now more parties are affected by
the standard (all those who would cause less than about
$31,000 of harm); the standard is higher than in the last
case because the dilution of incentives to take care due to
liability was lesser in that case. And where parties'
assets are only $60,000 and the probability of suit is 50%,
the optimal standard of care is $86.12 —-theoptimal standard
if regulation alone is employed ——andall parties are
affected by the standard. Therefore, and unlike in the
other two cases, in this last case use of regulation alone
is optimal; joint use of regulation and liability offers no
advantage.
example of the extension of the model. Modify the
example of the basic model by assuming that the harm that—23—
parties would cause in the event of an accident is the sum
of two elements: an amount known only by them and eqially
likely to be any thousand dollar amount between $0and
$90,000;and a parameter known only by the regulator and
equally likely to be $0, $10,000 or $20,000.
Graphs of the first-best levels of care as a function
of the component of the potential harm observed by the
parties are shown in Fig. 9 for each of the three different
levels of the parameter known to the regulator;19 thus the
graph where the parameter is $20,000 is the highest and that
where the parameter is $0 is the lowest of the three.
Also shown in Fig. 9 is the graph of care that would
be taken under liability alone if parties assets are $80,000
and the probability of suit is 90%.20 This graph is, of
course, unaffected by the actual level of the parameter
because it is known only to the regulator. The graph is
somewhat below the first-best graph when the parameter is
$10,000, which is parties' estimate of the parameter, due to
the dilution of incentives under liability; the graph is
much below the first best graph when the parameter is $20,000,
for here the true risk is greater than parties estimate; and
the graph is above the first-best graph (except over a small
region) when the parameter is $0, as in this case the true
risk is less than parties estimate.2'care
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The optimal standard of care if regulation is used
alone is shown in the Figure for each level of the parameter.
The optimal standard rises as the parameter rises:22 it is
$84.12 when the parameter is $0, $86.12 when the parameter
is $10,000, and $87.80 when the parameter is $20,000. Use
of these regulatory standards, however, turns out to be
inferior to use of liability alone.
Last, the optimal standards of care if regulation and
liability are used together are showninthe Figure. The
optimal standard is $70 if the parameter equals $10,000
(note that $70 is less than the $86.12 standard were reg-
ulation alone employed); and the optimal standard is $81 if
the parameter is $20,000 (and note that $81 is less than the
$87.80 standard). In these two cases, joint use of regulation
and liability is superior to use of regulation or of liability
alone. But in the case where the parameter is $0, the
optimal standard is $0, and it is not desirable to use
regulation in addition to liability; the reason is that
under liability alone, parties take more than enough care
given the true, low risk.
V.Concluding Comments
Let us conclude with a brief consideration of the
interpretation of the analysis and with a remark on a factor
of importance that was omitted from it, namely, the magnitude
of administrative costs.—25—
(a) The choices that society evidently has made over
use of liability and regulation may be identified, it is
tentatively suggested, with the theoretically desirable
choices of the model. That is, taking into account, on the
one hand, the informational advantage (or lack thereof) of
the private parties and, on the other hand, the possible
sources of dilution of incentives to reduce risk, one can
see a kind of rationality in the balance that has been
struck between use of the two ways of controlling risk.23
Consider first the area where society has placed chief
reliance on liability as the legal means of controlling
risk; consider, in other words, the familiar categories of
accident coming under the rubric of tort (for example, I chop
down a tree in my backyard and it strikesmy neighbor's garage;
I run for a bus and collide with someone). Here it does seem
that as a general matter, the knowledge possessed by private
parties about the particular dangers they create andthe
costs of meliorating them is significantly better than what
would be enjoyed by a regulatory authority. (How much would
such an authority know about the chance of this particular
tree in my particular backyard damaging that particular
neighbor's garage?) It also seems that the possibility that
parties would not be able to pay fully for harm done does
not represent a problem of great dimension (at least by
comparison to the situation that often obtains in areas of
regulation).24 Similarly, it seems thata chance that
parties will not face the threat of suit does not constitute—26—
a substantial problem; for the usual tort, the harm done
will not be difficult to attribute to the party who caused
it (there will be no mystery about the source of the damage
to my neighbor's garage or of the injury suffered by the
person at the bus stop), nor will other reasons why suit
might not be brought be of noticeable importance.25
The situation appears different, however, in areas
where use of regulation is siguificant. In such areas, the
information that is necessary to justify regulation is some-
times virtually common knowledge (driving at high speed in a
school zone or transporting explosives through tunnels
obviously presents unacceptable risks) or at least it is
fairly easy to obtain (appropriate procedures for pasteuri-
zation of milk); and where this is not true, the information
is often of a special and technical nature that may be
better appreciated by the regulatory authority. The latter
seems at least plausible in regard to many of the environ-
mental and health-related risks that are today increasingly
subject to regulation, for expert medical, epidemiological,
or ecological knowledge may be needed for their proper
assessment. (Nevertheless, it is certainly not claimed that
the informational advantage of the parties is uniformly
small or nonexistent in regulated areas.)
Secondly, the risks in regulated areas can often readily
be imagined to exceed the assets of responsible parties
(hotel fires, the collapse of dams, and explosions, for
example, can clearly result in losses surpassing the assets
of the individuals or firms that cause them); thus the—27-
incentives to reduce risk that are provided by liability
alone may be seriously inadequate. This factor may be of
particular importance again in respect to some of the health-
related and environmental risks, as they may cause losses of
extreme magnitude. (Consider the potential for harm asso-
ciated with nuclear accidents, widespread exposure to car-
cinogens such as asbestos, mass use of drugs with harmful
side-effects.) Furthermore, and still again in regard to
many of the health-related and environmental risks, the
incentives created by liability may be significantly dimin-
ished by the possibility that firms would not be sued for
harm done; for such risks frequently result in harm that is
difficult to trace to its source (was the individuals's lung
cancer due to conditions at his workplace, to medical x-radi-
ation, or to "natural" causes?) or that occurs only after
the passage of a long period of time; additionally, in some
instances the harm is so dispersed that no single injured
party would find legal action worthwhile.26
The hypothesis that the actual use of regulation and
liability is consistent with their desirable use in theory
is given further support by the fact that many if not most
risky activities are subject to both regulation and liability,
and that according to general legal principle, satisfaction
of regulatory requirements does not render parties immune
from liability;27 additionally, regulatory requirements seem
to be regarded as minimal. These qualitative characteristics
of the joint use of regulation and liability are, recall,-28-
those derived in the analysis, where it was shownthatit
might well be advantageous to employ both means of controlling
risk and to adopt a "low" regulatory standard (one less than
the standard were regulation used alone) because the incen-
tives created by liability would lead most parties to take a
higher and tolerably good level of care given their circum-
stances28
The hypothesis of consistency of theory with fact
should not of course be over interpreted. As stated at the
outset, the consistency is thought to exist only in a very
approximate sense, for the choices actually made concerning
regulation and liability are undoubtedly influenced by a
multitude of factors going beyond those of the analysis --
notably,the pressures of interest groups29 --andin any
event often will not be the result of a conscious and ex-
plicit use of a social cost-benefit calculus. It is there-
fore hardly surprising sometimes to hear assertions that
regulation is onerous or other times that it is lax.
(b)The principal normative implication of the analysis
is, obviously, that in assessing how much to regulate and
how much to rely on liability to control risk, careful
attention should be paid to the locus of information about
risk and to the importance of the factors that dilute the
incentive to take care under liability.
(c) Regarding the omitted issue of administrative
costs, the main point to be made is that there seems to be
an underlying advantage in favor of liability due to its-29—
being employed, by its nature, only if harm is done, whereas
adherence to regulation is determined, and the associated
administrative costs are borne, before, or at least in-
dependent of, the actual occurrence of harm. (Consider the
extreme case where taking appropriate care completely eli-
minates the possibility of harm. Here there would be no
administrative costs whatever under liability --forif
parties were induced to take appropriate care, there would
never be an occasion for its use --butthe costs of reg-
ulation would be positive.30) A fuller analysis of liability




Proof of Proposition 4. The argument consists of a series of
steps, the first four of which establish (a) and the last
three of which show (b).
(i) **mustlie in [x*(a),s*]: It is very easy to
verify that for every h, expected social costs are lower at
s =x*(a)than at smaller s, so tht s x*(a).
To demonstrate that s s, let C(s;r) be expected
social costs given s when regulation alone is employed, and
let C(s;rl) be expected social costs when regulation and
liability are jointly employed. Then for any s <2'we
claim that
(Al) C(s1;r) —C(s2;r)C(s1;rl) —C(s2;rl).
This can be demonstrated by showing that the corresponding





To verify (A2), consider Fig. 10, which shows in the regions
A, B, and C the different possible relations that may hold
among s, 2 and x2(h). It is clear that for h in the
region A, equality obtains, for the parties will act identi-
cally under regulation alone and under joint use of regula-
tion and liability. For h in region B, (A2) will be strict:









under joint use of regulation and liability, they will
increase care only from x(h) to (A2) thus becomes s +
consequently be unchanged.
Having established (A2) and therefore (Al), suppose
that s > s Then since s* minimizes C(s;rl) over s, we
know in particular that C(s*;rl) -C(s**;rl)0. But (Al)
then implies that C(s*;r) —C(s**;r)0, which contradicts
the fact that s is the uniquesthat minimizes expected
social costs under regulation alone. Hence it must be that
5*
(ii) If s s, then some parties will choose care
exceeding s**: Equivalently, we are to show that x(b) >
** Thus, suppose the contrary. Then for S s, the
second term in braces in (8') is relevant. Now since this
term has a unique minimum over all s at s ands* >s, the
term must have a unique minimum over s s at s*. But
this means that the term cannot have had a minimum at s,
which is a contradiction.
p(s1)hx2(h)
strictly since
< x(h) < x
strict: under
from s to
care and s1 <
than at
ity, care will
+ p(x(h))h; but the latter inequality holds
expected social costs are convex in care and
*(h). For h in region C, (A2) will also be
regulation alone parties will increase care
since expected social costs are convex in
< x*(h), expected social costs are lower at
but under joint use of regulation and liabil-
remain at the level xt(h), and costs will—32—
(iii) Jf ** < s, then is determined by the
first-order condition (12) and s > x*(a): From (ii), we
know that if s** 5* then the first term in braces in (8')
is relevant for all s in an interval properly including
x*(a) and In particular, then, at s the derivative
with respect to s of the term must be zero. But the de-
rivative is
h(s) h(s)






Now the first term of (A3') is positive, since we know from
(i) that s x*(a), since h(x*(a)) > a,3 and since h( )
isincreasing in its argument. Thus, if (A3') equals zero,
its second term must equal zero, which is (12).
To demonstrate that s > x*(a), we need only show that
(A3') is unequal to zero, and in fact negative, when eva-
luated at x*(a). (This will prove the result since by the
last paragraph it will mean that s is unequal to x*(a),
and by (i), s' x*(a).) Observe first that since h(x*(a))





is the mean of h conditional on its being in the interval
[a,h(s)]. The reader can easily verify that this tends to a
as h(s) tends to a and is stricity increasing in h(s).
Thus, since h(x*(a)) > a, (A4) must exceed a at sx*(a).
And it follows from this and the fact that 1 + p(x*(a))a
0 that the second term in braces in (A3') is negative when
evaluated at x*(a).
(iv) If (10) holds, then s** < *: Suppose otherwise.
Then by (1) s =s.But since (10) implies that the first
expression in braces in (B') is relevant at s, we need only
show that (A3') is positive at s to contradict the opti-
mality of s. To do this, note from (6) and (2) that
b
(A5) 1 + p?(s*)fhf(h)dh =0.
a
b
However, since (A4) is strictly less than fhf(h)dh when
a
evaluated at s*, it follows that the second term in braces
in (A3') is positive at s*. And since the first term in
(A3') is clearly positive at s*, (A3') must be postive.
We remark also that it is obvious that (10) will hold
if g and y are sufficiently high, for as q approaches 1 and
y approaches b, x(b) approaches x*(b) > 5*
(v) If ** =s*,then no party chooses care exceeding
5*: Since (10) implies that < s, we know that in this
case x(b) s. Our claim therefore follows.
(vi) If x(b) is sufficiently low, then s** =




as low as x*(a
We remark also that it is clear that asq decreases,
does x(b). and it approaches 0 asq approaches 0; and
similarly, as y decreases and approaches a. Hence, if
y is sufficiently small, $**= 5*. Q.E.D.
for an x2(b)x






But by (ii) we know
Hence, x*(a)
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1.See the brief discussion in the concluding comments.
2. It will be clear that the analysis would not be
changed in an essential way were the possibility considered
that enforcement of the regulatory standard was not perfect
or was probabilistic —-andthus that some parties might be
able to engage in their activities without adhering to the
regulatory standard.
3.This comparison of liability and regulation may be
contrasted with the comparison made in the interesting and
well known paper of Martin Weitzman (1974) by considering
the problem of pollution damage. In respect to this problem,
Weitzman compared regulation of the amount of pollution to
use of a pollution tax and he emphasized that there is no
natural advantage of either: not only might a social authority—36—
err in deciding on a regulatory standard owing to lack of
information about the costs and benefits ofpreventing
pollution, it might err also in setting a pollution tax, for
it would not generally be expected to know ahead of timethe
amount of damage that would be done by pollution.
Here, on the other hand, it is not use of a pollution
tax that is compared to regulation, it is liability. The
siguificance of this difference is that whereas the pollu-
tion tax is imposed before harm occurs and thereforenaturally
involves uncertainty as to its amount, liability isimposed
by its nature only when harm has occurred, arid therefore
presumably involves little (and in the model, no) uncertainty
over its amount. In other words, the problem here concerning
liability as an alternative to regulation does not involve
lack of information on the part of the socialauthority;
instead, as explained, it has to do with dilution of incen-
tives.
4.As will be seen, the assumption is really that not
only does the regulator alone "observe" the values of the
parameter, but also that the regulator does not communicate
its value to the parties. The justification for theasswnp-
tion is that sometimes information about risk cannoteasily
be conveyed to parties because of its complexity or its
technical character.
5.We assume that the (2) holds for the first-best x
for all h in [a,b), that is, that 1 <—p'(O)a.—37—
6.Differentiate (2) with respect to h to get 0 =
—p''(x)x'(h)h—p'(x),so that x'(h) =—p'(x)/(p''(x)h)>0
(since p'(x) (0and p''(x) >0).
7. In saying here that a party is liable for harm
done, we are implicitly assuming that the form of liability
is strict. Were we to consider instead the negligence
rule --underwhich a party would be liable only if his
level of care was inadequate, that is, less than x*(h) —-
thequalitative character of the results to be obtained
would be essentially unaltered. For instance, referring to
the next Proposition, the incentive to take care would still
generally be diluted if q (1or y <h;it is only that
x2(h) would be determined by a slightly different equation.
(Actually, x(h) would equal x*(qmin{h,y)) unless q andy
were sufficiently high, in which case it would equal x*(h).)
8. Here h( )denotesthe inverse of x( )wherethe
latter is rising; thus h(x1(h))) =hfor h in [ay) if y <b
arid for all h in [a,b] otherwise.
9.A solution to (8) and (8') exists since (8) is
continuous in s anditwill be showninstep Ci)ofthe
proof that s may be taken to lie in a closed and bounded
interval.—38-
10. It would be tedious to consider formally here (and
later) the cases where <1and yb or where g =1and y
<b.But it will be obvious from the proof that in the
former case, (a) and (b) will still hold. Andaslight
modification of the proof can be used to show that if q =1
and y is sufficiently high, then s* 0 (the analogue to
(a)), and that otherwise s =s.
11. Or, more precisely, s could equal any s
for use of such an s would not affect any party's behavior.
12. Condition (12) is really the analog of (6), as is
apparent when the latter is rewritten as 1 =—p'(s)E(h).
13. Note that although in the figure the graph of x
lies below that of when E(h2) >h,this need not be the
case (e.g., if h2 were less than but sufficiently close to
E(h2), then the graph of x would be above that of x2).
14. In (19) the function h1( )denotesthe inverse of
),andthus is analogous to the function h( )ofthe
previous section (see note 8 above).
15. Equally, s**(h2) could equal anysxL(a), for
use of such an a would not affect any party's behavior.—39—
16. Since p(x) =e,the first-order condition (2)
is 1 +.1e'h,so that x*(h) =lOlog(.].h);the graph is
thus a plot of lolog(.lh) for h in between $10,000 amd
$100, 000.
17. Under liability, care taken is, by (4) and note
16, x*(qmin(h,y)) =lOlog(.lgmin{h,yfl;the lower graphs
show thevaluesof this function of h for three different
sets of assuiriptions about q and y.
18. From (6) and note 16, we have s =x*(E(h))=
lOlog(.l(55,000))=86.12.
19. From note 16 we have x*(h) =lOlog(.l(h1
+h2)).
20. In this case we have from (15) and note 16 that
x(h1)
=lOlog((.1)(.9)E(min{h1+h2,80,0001), where
E(min{h1 +h2,80,000)) =(1/3)min{h1,80,000) +(l/3)min(h1
+10,000,80,000) +(l/3)min(h1
+20,000,80,000). (Con-
sideration of only this one of the three cases will be
enough to illustrate the main points of the extension of the
model, as they concern parties' perception of risk.)
21.We use the word "estimate" here even though in
factthe parties do not employ in their calculations a
point estimate of h2 but rather its probability distribu-
tion.-40-
22. From (7) and note 16, we haves*(h2) =x*(E(h1)
+
h2) lOlog(..l(45,000 +
23.This is the theme that is developed inShavell
(1983).
24. It should be noted in thisregard that widespread
ownership of liability insurance reduces the likelihoodthat
a party would be unable to pay for harm done(and although
it might also alter incentives totake care, this can be
argued not to provide an independent reason forregulation).
25. In terms of the model, thisparagraph may be
summarized by saying that if we had to makea broad gen-
eralization concerning the area of thetypical tort, it
would be that parties possesssuperior information, so that
the basic version of the modelapplies, and also that y and
g are both fairly high.
26. This paragraph may be summarizedby saying that in
the areas where regulation issignificant and the basic
model applies, the informationaladvantage of the parties
might not be great; that where the extension ofthe model
applies, the regulator may have an informationaladvantage
about an important aspect of risk; andthat y or q may be
low.-41-
27. See Prosser (1971), pp. 203-204; thus use of
regulation is indeed accompanied by use of liability.
28. See Proposition 4.
29. See George Stigler (1971), Richard Posner (1974),
and Sam Peltzman (1976).
30. In the case of the numerical example of the basic
model (Section III), the likelihood of an accident under
liability is on average about .0003. Thus, expected admini-
strative costs under liability will be lower than those
under regulation unless the cost of determining adherence to
regulation is much smaller than the administrative cost of
the liability system (which should not be equated with the
costs of going to court, for the parties to disputes settle
far more often than not). For instance, suppose that the
administrative costs of the liability system is $200 per
accident. (If, say, 90% of disputes are settled at an
administrative cost of about $100 and 10% go to trial at an
administrative cost of $1000, the expected administrative
cost given that an accident has occurred would be approxi-
mately $200). Then the expected administrative costs
associated with use of liability would be only .0003x$200 =
$.18.Hence the cost of determining adherence to regulation
would have to be less than this amount for regulation to
involve lower administrative costs. While this might seem-42-
unlikely, it must be adniitted that significant savings in
adntinistratjve costs might be achievable through use of
probabilistic means of enforcement of regulation.
31. See Wittman (1977), which discusses closely
related issues.
32. For any Ii such that x*(h) lies in the domain of
the function h( ),wehave h(x*(h)) >h;this is obvious
from the graph in Figure4.-43-
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